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Abstract—The NASA Constellation Program (CxP) is 
developing a two-element Earth-to-Orbit launch system to 
enable human exploration of the Moon. The first element, 
Ares I, is a human-rated system that consists of a first stage 
based on the Space Shuttle Program’s solid rocket booster 
(SRB) and an upper stage that consists of a four-crew Orion 
capsule, a service module, and a Launch Escape System. 
The second element, Ares V, is a Saturn V-plus category 
launch system that consists of the core stage with a cluster 
of six RS-68B engines and augmented with two 5.5-
segment SRBs, a Saturn-derived J-2X engine powering an 
Earth Departure Stage (EDS), and the lunar-lander vehicle 
payload, Altair.1,2 
Initial plans called for the Ares V to be launched first, 
followed the next day by the Ares I. After the EDS 
performs the final portion of ascent and subsequent orbit 
circularization, the Orion spacecraft then performs a 
rendezvous and docks with the EDS and its Altair payload. 
Following checkout, the integrated stack loiters in low Earth 
orbit (LEO) until the appropriate Trans-Lunar Injection 
(TLI) window opportunity opens, at which time the EDS 
propels the integrated Orion–Altair to the Moon.  
Successful completion of this “1½-launch” solution carries 
risks related to both the orbital lifetime of the assets and the 
probability of achieving the launch of the second vehicle 
within the orbital lifetime of the first. These risks, which are 
significant in terms of overall system design choices and 
probability of mission success, dictated a thorough re-
evaluation of the launch strategy, including the order of 
vehicle launch and the planned time period between 
launches.  
The goal of the effort described in this paper was to select a 
launch strategy that would result in the greatest possible 
1                                                          
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expected system performance, while accounting for launch 
risks and the cost of increased orbital lifetime.  
A Discrete Event Simulation (DES) model of the launch 
strategies was created to determine the probability of a 
second launch not occurring in a timely fashion (i.e., before 
the assets waiting in LEO expire). This data was then used, 
along with vehicle capability data, cost data, and design 
changes that increased loiter, to evaluate the impact of 
changes in strategy. The specific changes in strategy that 
were considered include decreasing the planned time 
between launches from 24 hours to 90 minutes, changing 
the launch order, and varying the LEO loiter capacity of the 
EDS and Orion systems.  
An overview of the launch strategy evaluation process is 
presented, along with results of specific cases that were 
analyzed. A high-level comparison of options is then 
presented, along with the conclusion derived from the 
analysis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Constellation architecture that is being developed by 
NASA for crewed human lunar missions involves two 
independent launches from the Earth with a rendezvous in 
low Earth orbit (LEO). The Ares I vehicle launches the 
Orion crew vehicle into LEO, and the Ares V launches the 
Earth Departure Stage (EDS) and the Altair lunar lander 
into orbit. The Orion vehicle and the EDS-Altair stack 
rendezvous in LEO before performing a Trans-Lunar 
Injection (TLI) burn. This launch architecture is referred to 
as a “1½-launch” solution because of the relative size of the 
Ares I to the Ares V. 
The 1½-launch solution imposes additional constraints on 
human lunar missions over a single launch scenario. The 
primary constraint involves the requirement for a LEO 
rendezvous between the two vehicles and the lifetimes of 
the elements in LEO. The Orion has a capability to loiter in 
LEO for a maximum of four days, limited by consumables. 
The EDS will have a maximum LEO loiter duration that is 
set by the amount of excess liquid oxygen and liquid 
hydrogen propellant that is available to account for the boil-
off that occurs during LEO loiter. These maximum loiter 
durations for the Orion and EDS require that the two 
launches will have to occur within some discrete time 
period in order to support rendezvous and a successful lunar 
mission. 
Three factors will have a major impact on the probability of 
success of conducting both launches in the available time 
period: the order that the vehicles are launched in, the 
maximum LEO loiter duration of the Orion and the EDS, 
and the separation time between the two launches.  
NASA completed a study to address the operational issues 
surrounding the 1½-launch solution and to compare various 
options for launch operations. The ultimate goal was to 
develop a “point-of-departure” operational launch option 
that would maximize the expected performance of the 
transportation system. Options were evaluated for launch 
order of the vehicles, loiter duration in LEO of the Orion 
and EDS, and the time separation between launches.  
The options that were evaluated are depicted as a trade tree 
in Figure 1. Two options were considered for launch order: 
launching Ares I first, followed by Ares V, identified as “I-
V”; and launching Ares V first, followed by Ares I, 
identified as “V-I”. In addition, two types of LEO loiter 
duration were considered. The first loiter option was to 
support only a single TLI window. The second loiter option 
was to support multiple TLI windows. Because of the 
limited loiter duration of the Orion crew module in LEO, 
the option to support multiple TLI windows is applicable 
only to a V-I launch order. Finally, options for the planned 
separation between the two launches of 90-minutes and 24-
hours were evaluated. The baseline established after the 
Exploration System Architecture Study (ESAS) of a V-I 
launch order, a loiter duration that supports multiple TLI 
windows, and a launch separation of 24-hours is identified 
in Figure 1. 
The selection of a point-of-departure does not represent the 
final determination of a launch option for the Constellation 
architecture. Rather, the point-of-departure represents a 
baseline from which on going lunar mission studies will be 
conducted. The baseline architecture may be changed in the 
future as further studies or revised data warrant. 
2. BACKGROUND 
The basic Constellation transportation architecture was 
initially defined as part of the ESAS [1] and in efforts 
immediately following that study [2]. As part of the baseline 
option developed at that time, it was assumed that the Ares 
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V heavy launch vehicle would launch first, with a capability 
to loiter for up to 95 days in LEO. The Ares I and Orion 
would then nominally launch 24 hours later and rendezvous 
with the EDS and lunar lander. If the Ares I failed to launch 
24 hours later, multiple relaunches could be attempted over 
the remainder of the 95-day loiter period, covering multiple 
TLI opportunities. The 95-day loiter period was selected to 
ensure that the crew could launch before the EDS 
operational lifetime expired. 
During subsequent design iterations of the transportation 
elements, a number of factors were identified that called the 
initial baseline launch option assumptions into question. 
The primary issue revolved around the ability of the EDS to 
provide for a 95-day LEO loiter. As the EDS orbits the 
Earth and is heated by the sun, the cryogenic fuel within the 
EDS tanks boils off at a rate of approximately 40 kg per 
day. In order to reserve a sufficient amount of fuel for the 
lunar mission, either the boil-off gasses must be reliquefied 
and returned to the tanks, or the boil-off must be vented and 
an additional amount of fuel carried to account for lost 
propellant. 
However, both of these solutions would have severe adverse 
impacts to the overall transportation architecture. With no 
re-liquefaction, the mass of extra propellant required to 
achieve a 95-day loiter capability would be at least 3,800 
kg. In addition, added mass penalties would be incurred for 
extra tank volume to hold the additional propellant. Because 
the total launch capability of the Ares V to LEO is limited, 
launching additional EDS propellant directly reduces the 
effective cargo at LEO. This, in turn, will limit the total 
lander mass, and the mass delivery capacity to the lunar 
surface.  
In addition, long loiter periods would result in a substantial 
increase in the complexity and dry mass of the EDS. 
Photovoltaic arrays would be required for power generation, 
reboost would be required, and additional 
micrometeoroid/orbital debris (MMOD) protection might be 
needed. None of the selected Ares V launch vehicle options 
could support an EDS with a 95-day loiter and a viable 
lunar lander. 
Reliquefaction of the boil-off would significantly reduce the 
need to carry additional propellant. However, the 
reliquefaction equipment would add additional mass to the 
EDS, similarly limiting lunar lander performance. Initial 
estimates for a reliquefaction system indicated that the mass 
could be similar to or greater than that of the additional 95 
days of propellant. In addition, the technology readiness 
level (TRL) of this technology is relatively low, and a major 
development effort would be required to include such a 
system on the EDS. For these reasons, reliquefaction was 
not investigated as a final solution. However, note that 
design reference missions for Constellation-based crewed 
Mars missions require a significant number of Ares V 
launches over an extended time period. So, ultimately, this 
type of technology may be required to support future 
exploration activities. 
Other issues regarding the operational concept for the 1½-
launch solution were also raised in the design iterations that 
followed ESAS. The time separation between the two 
launches was also identified as an important parameter. 
Analysis showed the probability of no second launch 
(PnSL) increased significantly as the period between 
launches increased, whereas a lower PnSL is desirable. This 
increase is primarily due to the possibility of weather or sea 
state change to unfavorable conditions in the interim period 
but is also impacted by possibility of a failure on the second 
vehicle during the separation period. The 24-hour launch 
separation that was identified as part of the initial 
architecture could result in a relatively high probability of 
no second launch. 
The final issue that was identified concerned the launch 
order of the Ares V and the Ares I and the difference in the 
consequences of a missed launch between the launch orders. 
For the baseline option, with the Ares V launching first, 
referred to as V-I in the analysis, a failure to launch the 
Ares I within the LEO duration of the EDS would result in 
the loss of the EDS and the Altair lander. Each of those 
elements would have to be replaced to re-fly the mission. 
The Ares V and the Altair are the most expensive elements 
in the transportation system. This type of loss would 
represent a large fraction of the total transportation element 
cost. In addition, concerns were voiced that the loss of an 
Ares V and Altair could impose substantial delays in 
establishing a permanently crewed lunar outpost. 
An alternate option, reversing the launch order, with the 
crewed Ares I launching first and the Ares V launching 
second, is referred to as I-V in this analysis. If the Ares V 
was not launched in time, the crew would be forced to 
return directly to Earth. In this case, an Ares I and an Orion 
service module would have to be replaced, and the Orion 
crew module would have to be refurbished in order to re-fly 
a mission. This type of loss would carry significantly less 
replacement cost than in the V-I option. 
The difference in consequence between the two options 
brought into question the baseline launch order. Although 
there is a strong initial reaction that it is most appropriate to 
launch the Ares V first so as not to risk the crew until the 
EDS and the lander are safely in orbit, the stark difference 
in consequence for these two options indicated that it might 
be preferable to reverse the launch order, launching the 
crew in the Ares I first and then launching the Ares V. In 
this case, the Ares V/EDS/Altair stack would not be lost if 
the Ares I could not be launched in time. Of course, in this 
case, the crew would be exposed to additional risk if the 
mission has to be repeated due to a missed second launch. 
The study that is described in this paper was intended to 
address the operational issues surrounding the 1½-launch 
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solution and to compare various options for launch 
operations. The goal of the effort was to develop an updated 
concept for 1½-launch operations that would balance the 
PnSL, the consequence of no second launch, and any added 
risk to the crew. The operational concept would include the 
order of vehicle launch, the planned separation between the 
launches, and the loiter periods for the Orion and the EDS. 
Orion loiter periods were limited to four days, as dictated by 
the current Orion design. 
Note that the updated operational concept for the 1½-launch 
option that was developed as a result of this effort is used 
only as a current reference. NASA is still leaving open the 
option to change the operational concept as more data 
become available or to develop a system that is capable of 
supporting multiple operational concepts, including launch 
order. 
3. LAUNCH OPPORTUNITIES AND TLI WINDOWS 
The baseline separation between the launch of the two 
vehicles was originally set at 24 hours. This separation 
allows the second vehicle to launch as the first passes over 
on the same approximate launch orbit one day later. Other 
launch options include a 90-minute separation, where the 
second vehicle would launch to meet the first after it has 
completed its first orbit, and any increment of 24 hours. For 
the purposes of this effort, only planned launch separations 
of 24 hours and 90 minutes were investigated. Separations 
of greater than 24 hours would only compound issues 
regarding weather and sea state change.  
The options available for the two-launch operational 
concept are limited by the timing of opportunities for TLI. 
The TLI opportunities for a particular lunar site occur at 
average intervals of approximately 9-10 days. The 
combined EDS/Altair/Orion stack must depart within a 
limited time window at TLI. The actual intervals vary 
somewhat from this average based on orbital mechanics. 
However a limited number of TLI opportunities occur at 
spacings greater than 10 days. 
The spacing of TLI opportunities limits the set of loiter 
periods that would be effective for both the Ares V and the 
Orion. In the baseline V-I option, the Ares V would be 
launched five days before a TLI opportunity. The Ares I 
launch would then be initially planned for 24 hours later, 
four days before the TLI opportunity. If that launch failed to 
occur, three more Ares I launch opportunities would occur 
at 24-hour intervals before the TLI opportunity. If the Ares I 
failed to launch on any of those attempts, additional 4-day 
launch opportunities would be available prior to each TLI 
opportunity. These Ares I launch opportunities would be 
available for the duration of the Ares V loiter capability. 
The spacing of launch opportunities for the V-I launch 
order with 90-minute and 24-hour separation are further 
described in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. 
Options for alternate Ares V loiter capability in the V-I 
order are dependent on the 10-day TLI interval. The lowest 
possible Ares V loiter that would be viable, with a 24-hour 
separation between launches, would be five days. That 
separation would provide for four Ares I launch attempts for 
a single TLI opportunity. Viable loiter durations would then 
increase in increments of 10 days, with each increment 
providing an additional four Ares I launch attempts. If the 
launch separation is decreased to 90 minutes, then each of 
the loiter periods would be deceased by one day, with a 4-
day minimum and added increments of 10 days.  
In a I-V option, the loiter duration of the Orion limits the 
launch attempts. In this option, the Ares I would always 
launch four days prior to the TLI opportunity. With a 90-
minute separation between launches, the Ares V would 
attempt to launch on the next orbit. If that launch did not 
occur, then the Ares V could attempt to launch on additional 
three opportunities at 24-hour intervals prior to the TLI 
opportunity, for a total of four possible attempts. If the 
launch separation was 24 hours, then three possible launch 
attempts would occur for the Ares V. In either case, if the 
Ares V could not launch by the TLI opportunity, then the 
crew would have to return to Earth. Utilizing more than a 
single TLI opportunity is not possible in the I-V option. The 
spacing of launch opportunities for the I-V launch order 
with 90-minute and 24-hour separation is further described 
in Figures 4 and 5, respectively. 
A loiter period of less than four days is also possible for 
either launch order. As part of this analysis, for the V-I 
launch order, EDS loiter periods of 1-4, 14, and 24 days 
were considered for the 90-minute launch separation, and 2-
5, 15, and 25 days were considered for the 24-hour 
separation. For the I-V launch order, a 4-day loiter was used 
for Orion, which corresponds to a 4-day EDS loiter at 90-
minutes separation and a 3-day EDS loiter at 24-hours 
separation. Table 1 details the full set of launch variables 
that were investigated as part of this study. 
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Table 1. 1½-Launch Options 
Launch 
Order 
Launch 
Separation 
Orion 
LEO 
Loiter 
EDS 
LEO 
Loiter 
Launch 
Opportunities 
for Second 
Vehicle 
V-I 
24-Hour 
1 Day 2 Days 1 
2 Days 3 Days 2 
3 Days 4 Days 3 
4 Days 5 Days 4 
4 Days 15 Days 8 
4 Days 25 Days 12 
90-Minute 
1 Day 1 Day 1 
2 Days 2 Days 2 
3 Days 3 Days 3 
4 Days 4 Days 4 
4 Days 14 Days 8 
4 Days 24 Days 12 
I-V 
24-Hour 
2 Days 1 Day 1 
3 Days 2 Days 2 
4 Days 3 Days 3 
90-Minute 
1 Day 1 Day 1 
2 Days 2 Days 2 
3 Days 3 Days 3 
4 Days 4 Days 4 
 
For all of the cases that were evaluated as part of this study, 
the assumption was made that both launch vehicles would 
be fully prepped and ready to fly on separate launch pads 
before the first vehicle would be launched. In addition, the 
assumption was made that the weather and sea state 
forecasts would support the launch of both vehicles. If 
either vehicle suffered a technical problem or if weather or 
sea state forecasts did not support the launch of both 
vehicles, then the entire launch process would be delayed 
until a later opportunity. 
4. PREDICTION OF PNSL 
PnSL was determined by using a discrete event simulation 
model called Constellation-Requirement Assessment 
Simulation Technique (C-RAST), which was built using 
Rockwell Automation’s Arena simulation software. C-
RAST models the launch countdown for the integrated Ares 
I–Orion vehicle and the integrated Ares V–Altair vehicle. 
C-RAST is an updated version of the Constellation-
Manifest Assessment Simulation Technique [3]. 
The C-RAST model begins at the point in time at which 
both vehicles are ready to begin launch countdown on their 
respective launch pads. C-RAST progresses through an 
approximate two to three day countdown with the 
possibility of launch delays occurring at discrete points 
along the countdown. These discrete points were identified 
based on the points at which launch vehicles such as the 
space shuttle and the Delta II experience launch countdown 
delays. These points include management reviews at two 
days prior to launch and one day prior to launch, at a 
decision point on whether or not to commit to loading the 
cryogenic propellants, at the propellant loading phase, at 
post-propellant loading operations including crew insertion, 
at the final management decision to commit to launch, and 
at terminal countdown operations. 
The probabilities of a launch delay occurring at these 
discrete points was determined after reviewing space shuttle 
and Delta II historical data and then filtering that data based 
on the differences between those launch vehicles and the 
Constellation vehicles. Sources of potential delays include 
vehicle malfunctions, weather, and sea state. Subject matter 
experts provided information that was also considered in 
developing the delay probabilities. The duration of a delay 
is modeled as a probability distribution by using a 
combination of space shuttle and Delta II historical data. 
Separate distributions were created to correspond to the type 
of delay. For example, weather delays tend to be one day in 
duration, whereas flight hardware delays tend to be longer. 
Table 2 shows the PnSL values for the V-I launch order 
with 90-minute and 24-hour separation for 4, 5, 14, and 15 
days of EDS LEO loiter capacity, respectively. Maximum 
Orion loiter capacity was assumed to be fixed at 
approximately four days. 
Table 2. PnSL in V-I Launch Order 
Launch 
Separation 
Orion LEO 
Loiter 
EDS LEO 
Loiter PnSL 
24-Hour 
1 Day 2 Days 26.9% 
2 Days 3 Days 22.9% 
3 Days 4 Days 16.9% 
4 Days 5 Days 14.1% 
4 Days 15 Days 5.5% 
4 Days 25 Days 4.0% 
90-Minute 
1 Day 1 Day 8.7% 
2 Days 2 Days 6.8% 
3 Days 3 Days 5.9% 
4 Days 4 Days 4.7% 
4 Days 14 Days 1.9% 
4 Days 24 Days 1.2% 
 
Similarly, Table 3 shows the PnSL data for the I-V launch 
order with 90-minute and 24-hour separation. Due to the 4-
day loiter limitation of the Orion, cases with greater loiter 
duration for the EDS are not applicable because the Orion is 
placed in orbit first. 
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Table 3. PnSL in I-V Launch Order 
Launch 
Separation 
Orion LEO 
Loiter 
EDS LEO 
Loiter PnSL 
24-Hour 
2 Days 1 Day 20.8% 
3 Days 2 Days 15.3% 
4 Days 3 Days 13.0% 
90-Minute 
1 Day 1 Day 10.8% 
2 Days 2 Days 8.1% 
3 Days 3 Days 7.0% 
4 Days 4 Days 5.4% 
 
5. VEHICLE AND ELEMENT COSTS 
A major factor that was considered in the analysis of the 
1½-launch operational concepts is the relative cost of the 
transportation elements. If a significant disparity exists 
between the costs of an Ares I stack and an Ares V stack, 
then the total risks should be evaluated rather than just 
focusing on the probability of failure. 
Costs estimates were developed for each of the relevant 
transportation elements based on data provided from the 
project offices. For the Ares I, the Ares V, and the Orion 
service module, the marginal unit costs were used as an 
estimate for the per-unit replacement cost. Because a large 
number of these elements will be used over the course of 
the ISS and lunar programs, these elements were assumed to 
be assembly-line-type items. If a replacement unit were 
needed, the next unit off of the line could be used. No 
significant added fixed costs were assumed for acquiring an 
additional unit. For the Ares V, cost estimates were 
developed for two different options. The baseline 
architecture assumes that the 51.0.48 option [4] is used for 
the Ares V. This option represents the current baseline Ares 
V configuration for the Constellation Program. However, 
this option is limited to a 71.1 t capability to LEO. Certain 
launch options may require increased Ares V capability, 
which would dictate an upgrade to the 51.0.47 option with a 
capability of 74.7 t to LEO. 
For the Orion crew module, the marginal cost of 
refurbishment was used. Again, no added fixed costs were 
assumed to be necessary to refurbish an additional unit. 
For the Altair lunar lander, both fixed and marginal costs 
per unit were used for the analysis. Because the number of 
Altair landers is expected to be relatively limited and many 
components may be procured as fixed unit purchases up 
front, the production of an additional lander may require a 
substantial fraction of the fixed costs to be incurred in order 
to resume production. However, the total fraction of the 
fixed costs that would be incurred is unclear. For the 
purposes of comparing the 1½-launch options, the full fixed 
and marginal costs were used. However, a sensitivity 
analysis was also completed over a range of Altair costs 
with the marginal cost only representing the low end and the 
full cost representing the high end.  
For presentation in this report, all cost data has been 
normalized to the cost of Ares I stack equivalents. Actual 
cost estimates were used in the comparison of options for 
the decision makers. However, because the primary cost 
issue reflects the relative difference in cost between the 
Ares I and the Ares V stacks, the normalization of the cost 
data does not impact the analysis or the results presented in 
this paper. All costs were normalized by the cost of an Ares 
I stack, which included the cost of the Ares I crew launch 
vehicle, the Orion service module, the Launch Escape 
System, and the refurbishment of the Orion crew module. 
All costs are, therefore, presented as Ares I stack 
equivalents, or AI. These figures reflect the relative cost of 
each transportation element as compared with the cost of an 
Ares I stack. Table 4 details the cost data used for this 
analysis. 
Table 4. Replacement Cost Estimates for Transportation 
Elements 
Element Per Unit Cost 
(Ares I Stack 
Equiv.) 
 
Ares I – Marginal Cost 0.40 AI 
Orion SM & CM Refurbishment – 
Marginal Cost 
0.60 AI 
 
Ares V (51.0.48) – Marginal Cost 0.90 AI 
Ares V (51.0.47) – Marginal Cost 1.13 AI 
 
Altair – Fixed Cost 1.19 AI 
Altair - Marginal Cost 0.79 AI 
Altair - Total 1.98 AI 
 
6. PROBABILITY OF LOSS OF CREW 
The initial selection of a V-I launch order was predicated on 
two factors. The first was the ability to add substantial loiter 
time to the EDS if the Ares V was launched first. The other 
factor, which is also potentially significant, is the added risk 
to the crew if the Ares I were to be launched first. In that 
option, the crew would be placed into LEO prior to the 
launch attempt of the Ares V. If the Ares V were not able to 
launch in the available four-day window, then the crew 
would have to return to Earth. If the mission were to be re-
attempted later, then a crew would again have to be placed 
in LEO. This, in effect, exposes a crew to an additional 
launch, LEO operations, and entry, descent, and landing 
(EDL).  
For the V-I launch order, no additional risk to the crew 
would result from the 1½-launch operations. However, with 
90-minute separation, other potential risks to the crew for a 
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V-I launch order must be considered. In this case, NASA 
has determined that inserting the Orion crew into the 
capsule and preparing for launch in the 90-minutes between 
launches would be difficult. Therefore, the crew would 
most likely have to be on the pad, in the capsule, when the 
Ares V launches. If an incident were to occur on the pad or 
in the initial stages of launch that resulted in a catastrophic 
loss of the Ares V, then the crew would be in some potential 
danger. This represents an added crew risk for the V-I 
launch order if a 90-minute separation were used. In the 24-
hour case, the crew would not be exposed to this type of 
risk. 
In order to accurately compare the risks to the crew due to 
launch order between cases, both the added launch risk for 
I-V options and the range safety issues for V-I options need 
to be considered. 
For an Ares I flight that is forced to return to Earth with no 
TLI, the total PLOC for the crew is the sum of the risks of 
the Ares I launch, four days of Orion LEO operations, and 
an EDL from LEO. Based upon the current risk estimates 
for the Ares I and Orion designs, the PLOC for a LEO 
mission is estimated to be approximately 0.00253 or 1 in 
396. As the designs for the Ares I and the Orion mature and 
risk is “bought out” of the systems, these risk estimates are 
likely to improve. For reference, the requirement for crew 
risk for the orbital mission, derived from the Constellation 
Architecture Requirements Document (CARD) is 0.00036, 
or 1 in 2,793. However, in order to be as conservative as 
possible in relation to crew safety, the current risk value 
was used. Table 5 details the breakdown of the PLOC for 
both the current and CARD estimates. 
Table 5. PLOC Estimates for 4-Day Orion LEO Mission 
Phase Current 
PLOC 
CARD 
Requirement 
Ares I Launch 0.00077 (1/1300) 0.00011 (1/9168)
LEO Loiter (4-Days) 0.00071 (1/1400) 0.00010 (1/9873)
EDL from LEO 0.00104 (1/960) 0.00015 (1/6770)
Total 0.00253 (1/396) 0.00036 (1/2793)
 
The added risk to the crew in the I-V option can be 
calculated as the total Probability of loss of Crew (PLOC) 
for an orbital mission multiplied by the probability that the 
crew will be required to refly the flight for a given mission, 
which is equal to the probability that the Ares V does not 
launch at all (PnSL) plus the probability that the Ares V 
launches (Probability of Second Launch (PSL)) but fails to 
reach LEO. 
Added crew risk for I-V launch order = PLOCLEO *   
(PnSL + PSL * PAres V Ascent Failure) 
where (1) 
PSL = 1 – PnSL 
PAres V Ascent Failure = 0.0115. 
Using the PnSL of 5.4% for the I-V launch order with a 90-
minute separation and four days of loiter, the added risk to 
the crew per mission is equal to 0.000164, or 1 in 6,092. 
Added crew risk for I-V launch order = 0.00253 *  (2) 
(0.054 + 0.946 * 0.0115) = 0.000164 
 
Quantitatively assessing the risks that the crew faces 
because the are within the Flight Hazard Area for the V-I 
launch order with a 90-minute separation is not currently 
possible. However, based on the opinion of subject-matter 
experts, this risk is not considered to be insignificant. The 
crew faces no significant added risk for a V-I launch order 
with a 24-hour separation because they would not be loaded 
into the Orion until after the launch of the Ares V. 
7. FIGURES OF MERIT 
The goal of the launch order analysis was to evaluate the 
identified operational concepts and then produce a series of 
relevant figures of merit (FOM) for each one. The most 
basic metric that was considered was the probability that 
each concept would result in a failure to launch the second 
vehicle. The FOMs for the study had to cover a number of 
areas that were significant to decision makers on selecting a 
concept.  
Probability of No Second Launch 
This metric not only contributes to expected losses but also 
stands alone as an important measurement of success or 
failure. Because any failure to launch the second flight in a 
timely manner will result in the loss of a vehicle and would 
force the flight to be reflown, some adverse public and 
political reaction is likely, even if such a loss is anticipated 
by NASA. 
Cost of Failure 
The primary direct impact on NASA of a failed second 
launch would be the cost to replace hardware and attempt to 
refly the mission. Although other options may ultimately be 
pursued by NASA if such an event did occur, such as 
cancelling the mission, the replacement cost remains an 
indicator of the value of the hardware that is lost.  
In this analysis, the metric that was selected is the expected 
cost of replacement hardware. The expected cost is 
calculated as the product of the PnSL for each option and 
the cost of the hardware that is lost for that option. This 
value is not the actual replacement cost per mission if a 
second launch failure did occur. It is a probabilistic 
amortization of those costs. These costs would effectively 
be imposed on every human lunar mission resulting in a 
large added cost over the program. 
In the case of the V-I launch order, the cost of lost hardware 
is the sum of the costs for the Ares V booster, the EDS, and 
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the Altair lander. In reality, some cost would also be 
incurred to replace lost cargo on the lander. However, for 
this study these costs were considered to be negligible.  
For the I-V launch order, the cost of lost hardware is the 
sum of the costs for replacement of the Ares I and the Orion 
service module, as well as the cost of refurbishment for the 
Orion command module. 
Loss of Delivery Capability to the Surface 
This metric captures the negative impacts of increasing the 
loiter period for the Ares V. In the V-I launch order, as the 
loiter period is increased, the total cargo delivery capacity 
of the transportation system to the lunar surface decreases. 
This penalty, unlike the replacement cost, is not 
probabilistic but is incurred on every lunar mission. 
Additional Risk to the Crew 
The additional risk to the crew for each option was 
considered as a primary metric by decision makers. As 
described, the quantitative added risk for the I-V launch 
option was calculated as a metric. For the V-I 90-minute 
option, the added risk was treated qualitatively. 
Additional Costs or Complexities 
Aside from the four basic FOMs described above, 
additional complexities had to be considered for certain 
launch options. The most significant of these complexities 
was the total launch vehicle capability. In certain cases, the 
additional EDS propellant load was so great that, with the 
baseline Ares V option, there would not be enough cargo 
delivery capacity to LEO to support a viable lunar lander. In 
these cases, the application of that launch option would 
require an upgrade to the capacity of the Ares V. This 
would lead to a significant increase in both Design, 
Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E) costs and 
production costs for every flight. 
8. SELECTION OF FINAL LAUNCH OPTIONS 
An initial evaluation of the full set of 1½-launch options 
was evaluated across the described FOMs. The goal of this 
initial analysis was to select a subset of options for final 
analysis and comparison that would represent the best 
performance across all of the FOMs.  
90-Minute versus 24-Hour Separation 
Before investigating launch order or loiter duration in detail, 
basic results comparing the PnSL for 90-minute and 24-
hour launch separation were provided to decision makers. 
Table 6 summarizes the PnSL values for each of these 
cases. 
Table 6. Comparison of PnSL for 90-Minute and  
24-Hour Separation Cases 
90-Minute 
Separation 
PnSL  24-Hour 
Separation 
PnSL 
I-V  
4-Day Orion 
4-Day EDS 
5.4% 
I-V  
4-Day Orion 
3-Day EDS 
13.0% 
V-I 
4-Day Orion 
4-Day EDS 
4.7% 
V-I 
4-Day Orion 
5-Day EDS 
14.1% 
V-I 
4-Day Orion 
14-Day EDS 
1.9% 
V-I 
4-Day Orion 
15-Day EDS 
5.5% 
 
The PnSL for the 24-hour cases are significantly worse than 
those for the respective 90-minute counterparts. A number 
of factors cause the 24-hour PnSL results to be so relatively 
poor. First, the 24-hour separation allows one less launch 
attempt than for the 90-minute case. Second, the 24-hour 
separation introduces a greater probability that the weather 
or sea state could change and fall outside the limits between 
launches. Finally, the increased time between launches 
increases the probability that a failure will occur in the 
second launch vehicle as a result of the longer period for 
such a failure to manifest. 
Certain operational complexities would be incurred for a 
90-minute launch separation, as compared with the baseline 
24-hour separation. Final countdown for both vehicles 
would overlap and, as described earlier, in a I-V launch 
order, the crew would be in the flight hazard area of the 
Ares V. However, NASA has investigated operational 
concepts for a 90-minute separation and has found no major 
barriers. 
Based upon this PnSL data, it was determined that the 
added probability of mission failure for a 24-hour 
separation for any given launch option was simply too large 
to be tolerated. The added launch complexity and flight 
hazard risk of the 90-minute case did not justify the added 
probability of mission failure. The political and public 
perception of these types of failures, especially multiple 
similar failures, is likely to be poor. In the case of a V-I 
launch order, a high-cost asset (2.88–3.11 AI) is being lost. 
In the case of a I-V launch order, the appearance would be 
that the crew was launched for no reason, in addition to an 
Ares I stack loss. 
For these reasons, the decision was made to not investigate 
further the 24-hour separation cases. Therefore, the point-
of-departure architecture was changed to a 90-minute 
separation.  
Loiter Duration 
For each of the 1½-launch order options, cases were 
evaluated with varying loiter durations in LEO in order to 
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select loiter periods that would be optimal for each launch 
sequence.  
 
Table 7. Comparison of FOMs Across Loiter Period Options for V-I Launch Order 
(90-Minute Launch Separation) 
Ares V 
Loiter, 
Days 
PnSL 
Cost of No 
Second 
Launch 
(Ares I Stack 
Equiv.) 
Expected Vehicle 
Replacement Cost, per 
Crewed Mission 
(Ares I Stack Equiv.) 
Change in 
Propellant 
Mass, kg 
Cost to 
Provide 
Added 
Loiter 
1 8.7% (1/11.5) 2.88 AI 0.25 AI -119 0 
2 6.8% (1/14.7) 2.88 AI 0.20 AI -79 0 
3 5.9% (1/16.9) 2.88 AI 0.17 AI -40 0 
4 4.7% (1/21.3) 2.88 AI 0.14 AI 0 0 
14 1.9% (1/52.6) 3.11+ AI 0.06 AI 395 >$1B+ 
24 1.2% (1/83.3) N/A N/A 834 N/A 
 
Table 8. Comparison of FOMs Across Loiter Period Options for I-V Launch Order 
(90-Minute Launch Separation) 
Ares I 
Loiter, 
Days 
PnSL 
Cost of No 
Second Launch 
(Ares I Stack 
Equiv.) 
Expected Vehicle 
Replacement Cost, per 
Crewed Mission 
(Ares I Stack Equiv.) 
Added 
Loiter 
Mass 
Added 
PLOC 
1 10.8% (1/9.2) 1.00 AI 0.11 AI -119 0.00030 
2 8.1% (1/12.3) 1.00 AI 0.08 AI -79 0.00023 
3 7.0% (1/14.3) 1.00 AI 0.07 AI -40 0.00020 
4 5.4% (1/18.5) 1.00 AI 0.05 AI 0 0.00016 
 
 
For the V-I launch order, EDS loiter durations of 1, 2, 3, 4, 
14, and 24 days were investigated. For the 4-, 14-, and 24-
day EDS loiter periods, an Orion loiter of 4 days (the design 
maximum) was used. For the 1-, 2-, and 3-day EDS loiter 
cases, the Orion loiter period would match the EDS loiter, 
although no mass changes were made to the Orion design. 
Table 7 shows the PnSL and cost results for each V-I case. 
In these results shown in Table 7, the cost of No Second 
Launch was 2.88 AI for each of the cases up to a 4-day EDS 
loiter. This replacement cost estimate corresponds to the 
51.0.48 Ares V design. For the 14-day loiter case, the 
amount of excess propellant that is required for boil-off 
increases by 395 kg from the 4-day baseline amount. An 
additional mass increase would also be required to account 
for the additional required tankage, photovoltaic arrays, 
MMOD protection, and reboost. The 51.0.48 Ares V design 
would not be viable with that amount of additional mass. 
For a 14-day loiter period, in order to produce a viable 
architecture, the Ares V would have to be switched to the 
51.0.47 design option, which includes composite solid 
rocket booster (SRB) casings and hydroxyl-terminated 
polybutadiene (HTPB) SRB propellant. The 51.0.47 has a 
greater marginal cost than the 51.0.48, which increases the 
cost of No Second Launch from 2.88 to 3.11 AI. In 
addition, there would be added costs that were not 
calculated as part of this study for the added EDS 
complexity. 
A 24-day loiter period, which would require an additional 
439 kg of propellant beyond the 14-day case and additional 
tankage mass, was not considered to be a viable option even 
with the 51.0.47 Ares V. The reduction in PnSL between 14 
and 24 days was relatively small (0.019 and 0.012, 
respectively) compared with the added mass that would be 
required.  
The 4-day EDS loiter case provides 1000 kg delivery 
capability to the lunar surface. Reducing the loiter period 
below four days would only provide a small marginal 
increase in surface delivery capability. Because the PnSL 
and the expected vehicle replacement costs grow 
substantially worse as the loiter period is reduced below 
four days, the 1-, 2-, and 3-day loiter periods were 
determined to be suboptimal. For the V-I launch order, the 
4-day EDS loiter with the 51.0.48 Ares V and the 14-day 
EDS loiter with the 51.0.47 Ares V were selected as 
candidate cases for final comparison. 
For the I-V launch order, the EDS and Orion loiter periods 
of one, two, three, and four days were considered. Again, 
the Orion mass was not varied for shorter LEO durations. 
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Table 8 shows the PnSL, cost, and PLOC data for each of 
these options. 
As can be seen from the data in Table 8, both the PnSL and 
the expected vehicle replacement cost increase rapidly as 
the loiter period decreases below 4 days. In addition, 
because the PnSL increases, the added PLOC also increases 
substantially as the loiter duration is shortened. As with the 
V-I case, the reduction in loiter mass that can be achieved 
by shortening the loiter period below 4 days is relatively 
small. For the I-V launch order, loiter periods for the EDS 
and Orion of less than 4 days were considered to be sub-
optimal. Only the four-day loiter period was considered for 
the I-V launch order in the final comparison of cases. 
9. COMPARISON OF LAUNCH OPTIONS 
Based on the results that are described earlier, three cases 
were evaluated and compared in the final definition of a 
1½-launch point operational concept. Table 9 describes the 
three cases. 
Table 9. Downselected Launch Options 
Case Launch 
Order 
EDS 
Loiter 
Orion 
Loiter 
Separation 
1 I-V 4-Days 4-Days 90-Minute 
2 V-I 4-Days 4-Days 90-Minute 
3 V-I 14-Days 4-Days 90-Minute 
 
The three final options were compared for each identified 
FOM. The option(s) that maximized performance for each 
FOM were identified. Finally, the results were subjectively 
compared across all of the FOMs. 
PnSL and Cost of Failure 
Table 10 summarizes the PnSL and replacement cost 
metrics for each of the three final options. 
The data in Table 10 shows that a V-I launch order with a 
14-day loiter provides the lowest possible PnSL at 1.9%. 
The 4-day loiter cases for the V-I and I-V launch order are 
similar at 4.7% and 5.4%, respectively. For the expected 
vehicle replacement cost, the I-V 4-day case provides the 
lowest cost, at 0.05 AI per mission. The V-I 14-day loiter, 
even with its small PnSL, has a larger expected cost of 0.06 
AI. The expected vehicle replacement cost of the 4-day V-I 
case is significantly higher at 0.14 AI because of the higher 
stack replacement cost. 
Table 10. Comparison of PnSL and Cost of Failure 
Case PnSL Cost of No 
Second 
Launch 
(Ares I Stack 
Equiv.) 
Expected Vehicle 
Replacement Cost, 
per Crewed Mission
(Ares I Stack Equiv.)
I-V 4-Day 
Loiter 5.4% 1.00 AI 0.05 AI 
V-I 4-Day 
Loiter 4.7% 2.88 AI 0.14 AI 
V-I 14-
Day Loiter 1.9% 3.11+ AI 0.06 AI 
 
Added Probability of Loss of Crew 
It is not possible to quantitatively compare the added 
probability of loss of crew as a result of the 1½-launch 
operations between the I-V and V-I launch orders. While 
the PLOC that is added due the possibility of reflying a 
mission can be determined for the I-V order, it is not 
possible at this time to determine the added PLOC for the 
crew in the Ares V flight hazard area in the V-I order. 
However, the cases can be compared subjectively, to 
determine if added PLOC supports the selection of one 
option over another. Table 11 summarizes the added PLOC 
for each case. 
Table 11. Comparison of Added PLOC 
Case Added PLOC 
I-V 4-Day Loiter 1/6,092 
V-I 4-Day Loiter Crew within Ares V Flight Hazard Area 
V-I 14-Day Loiter Crew within Ares V Flight Hazard Area 
 
Other Considerations 
Aside from the primary metrics described above, several 
other issues were taken into consideration for these cases. 
Table 12 summarizes these issues for each option. 
The primary consideration was the additional requirements 
that are imposed by a 14-day loiter. In order to support a 14-
day loiter, the EDS is essentially transformed from a stage 
to an independent vehicle. This transformation would 
require significant added mass for increased MMOD 
protection, photovoltaic arrays, and additional propellant, 
beyond the boil-off, for reboost and attitude control. The net 
effect is a substantial increase in both the mass and 
complexity for the EDS. As discussed previously, this mass 
increase, along with the added mass for boil-off, results in 
the 51.0.48 Ares V option not being viable. The 51.0.47 
Ares V option would, therefore, be required to support an 
EDS with a 14-day loiter. The change in the Ares V and 
EDS designs not only increases the unit cost of the vehicle, 
as described above, but will also increase the DDT&E costs 
of the elements by a minimum estimated value of $1B. The 
total increase could be substantially greater. 
Two other considerations apply to both of the V-I cases. 
The first issue involves Ares I flight rules. In a V-I launch 
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order, where the Ares V and the Altair have been placed in 
LEO prior to the crew launch, as the launch opportunities 
expires, pressure could be placed on launch controllers to 
relax the Ares I launch rules in order to avoid the loss of the 
Ares V stack in orbit. 
 
Table 12. Comparison of Other Considerations 
Case Cost to Provide 
Added Loiter 
Other Considerations for a “No Second Launch” 
Event 
I-V 4-Day Loiter 0  
V-I 4-Day Loiter 0 
• Replacement of Ares V stack could involve 
significant Program delays 
• Potential pressure to relax Ares I flight rules to avoid 
the loss of Ares V stack 
V-I 14-Day Loiter >$1B+ 
In addition to previous case: 
• Ares V EDS complexity and mass increases as a 
function of loiter 
– MMOD Protection 
– PV Arrays 
– Additional propellant for re-boost and 
attitude control 
 
Table 13. Summary Comparison of Final Cases 
Case PnSL 
Expected Vehicle 
Replacement Cost, 
per Crewed Mission 
(Ares I Stack Equiv.) 
Cost to 
Provide 
Added 
Loiter 
Added PLOC Other Considerations for a “No Second Launch” Event 
I-V 
4-Day 
Loiter 
5.4% 0.05 AI 0 1/6,092  
V-I 
4-Day 
Loiter 
4.7% 0.14 AI 0 
Crew within 
Ares V Flight 
Hazard Area 
• Replacement of Ares V stack 
could involve significant 
Program delays 
• Potential pressure to relax Ares I 
flight rules to avoid the loss of 
Ares V stack 
V-I 
14-Day 
Loiter 
1.9% 0.06 AI >$1B+ Crew within 
Ares V Flight 
Hazard Area 
In addition to previous case: 
• Ares V EDS complexity and 
mass increases as a function of 
loiter 
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Second, differences exist in the programmatic consequences 
between the loss of an Ares I stack and an Ares V stack, 
beyond the replacement cost. Ares I and Orion flight rates 
could be relatively high to support ISS and lunar missions. 
Replacing one of these stacks would be a matter of 
accelerating the next launch vehicle in the pipeline. For the 
Ares V and Altair, however, the replacement could involve 
more significant delays. The Ares V itself would be a more 
expensive and more complex vehicle to replace. The Altair 
lander presents the greatest complexities. A limited number 
of landers will be produced for the lunar campaign. 
Acquiring an additional replacement lander could involve 
the reopening of production lines. In addition, each Altair 
will be unique to some degree because of the mission 
objectives and the cargo that it carries. Finally, the cargo 
itself would need to be replaced in the event of a loss. 
Summary Comparison 
Table 13 summarizes the comparison of the three launch 
options. In this table, the cells that indicate potential 
negative aspects for each case are highlighted. 
I-V 4-Day EDS Loiter 4-Day Orion Loiter—The I-V launch 
order case resulted in the highest PnSL of the three final 
cases, with a probability of a missed second launch of 5.4% 
per mission. However, because of the low cost of failure for 
this case, it also had the lowest expected vehicle 
replacement cost at 0.05 AI per mission.  
V-I 4-Day EDS Loiter 4-Day Orion Loiter—The V-I option 
with 4-day EDS and Orion loiter has a PnSL that is similar 
to that for the I-V option at 4.7%. The PnSL for this case 
was somewhat lower due to the lower complexity of the 
second launch vehicle. This case, however, resulted in the 
greatest expected cost of failure at 0.14 AI. In addition, the 
V-I launch order includes the additional considerations that 
involve the pressure to relax flight rules and the difficulty in 
replacing an Ares V stack. 
V-I 14-Day EDS Loiter 4-Day Orion Loiter— Of the three 
options, the V-I 14-day EDS loiter case presented the best 
PnSL value. The 1.9% PnSL was less than half the PnSL for 
either of the 4-day loiter cases. However, because of the 
high cost of failure, the overall expected vehicle 
replacement cost per mission was similar to that of the I-V 
4-day case. 
In evaluating this case, the primary concern, however, was 
over the other required costs. Because of the added boil-off 
propellant and other described EDS complexities required 
to support this duration, the baseline 51.0.48 Ares V option 
was no longer viable. The 51.0.47 Ares V option, with an 
upgraded capacity, would be required. The DDT&E costs 
for this upgrade would be large. The cost difference for the 
Ares V upgrade alone is estimated to be greater than $1B. In 
addition, the costs to upgrade the EDS, including 
photovoltaic arrays and MMOD protection, would be 
added. Although these are one-time DDT&E costs rather 
than recurring costs, they occur in a phase of the program 
where the budget is most restricted.  
In addition, the 51.0.47 design for the Ares V has been 
reserved as an option in case it is needed because of mass 
growth or performance uncertainty for the transportation 
system. If the upgraded design is adopted in the baseline to 
support a 14-day loiter and a more complex EDS, then no 
current options are available to provide a hedge against 
mass growth or performance uncertainty in the 
transportation system. While further upgrades to the EDS 
are possible, these upgrades were not considered desirable 
when the 51.0.48 and 51.0.47 options were down-selected 
for further consideration by the Constellation Program. 
Because of the requirement to upgrade the Ares V to the 
51.0.47 option, as well as the added complexity of the EDS 
stage, the V-I 14-day loiter case was removed from 
consideration for the 1½-launch launch operational concept. 
While this option offers a significantly lesser PnSL than the 
other two options at 1.9% versus 4.7% - 5.4%, the added 
costs and risks associated with this option, particularly costs 
during the crucial DDT&E period, were determined to be 
unacceptable. This opinion was reinforced by the results for 
total expected replacement cost. While the V-I 14-day loiter 
case has a low PnSL, because of the high consequence of 
failure, the total expected replacement cost was actually 
somewhat greater than for the I-V 4-day loiter case. 
10. SELECTION OF 11/2-LAUNCH POINT-OF-
DEPARTURE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
As described previously, the V-I 14-day loiter case was 
determined by decision makers to involve too much added 
cost and risk to justify the resultant improvement in PnSL. 
The decision was reinforced by the fact that the second 
primary metric, the expected cost of failure, was not 
improved by the V-I case with a longer loiter period. 
The two final cases, the I-V 4-day loiter and the V-I 4-day 
loiter, were compared; the I-V launch order was selected for 
the baseline point-of-departure architecture.  
The PnSL values, which represent the probability of a 
failure event during the dual launch phase, were similar for 
the I-V and V-I cases, at 5.4% and 4.7%, respectively. The 
expected replacement cost per mission was significantly 
lower for the I-V case, however. Even with the cost 
uncertainty, the I-V case clearly would likely always result 
in a lower total cost. 
Crew safety was a major consideration in selecting between 
the two cases. A clear, quantifiable added risk to the crew 
exists in selecting the I-V launch order. The crew would be 
required to endure an additional set of launch, loiter, and 
EDL events in the case of a missed second launch. 
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However, because the probability of loss of crew is 
conditional to the PnSL, the overall added risk of 1 in 6,092 
is considered to be quite small. This is particularly true 
when the added risk is compared with the overall risks to 
the crew that are anticipated for a human lunar mission. 
In addition, although they could not be quantified at this 
point in time, additional crew risks are associated with the 
V-I launch order. Although no determination can be made at 
this point whether these range safety risks may be similar in 
magnitude to the added risks in the I-V case, they certainly 
cannot be totally discounted. 
The selected I-V case with a 4-day loiter and 90-minute 
separation offered the most balanced results across the 
FOMs that were used in this study. The PnSL of 5.4% was 
larger than other cases but similar to the PnSL that could be 
achieved in any case if the Ares V was limited to the 
51.0.48 option. The consequence of failure in this case was 
much less than for the V-I case, which resulted in an 
expected cost of less than half of that for the V-I launch 
order. 
In addition, the other complexities that were associated with 
the V-I launch order–potential pressure to relax flight rules 
and the disruptions caused by having to replace an Ares V–
also trended toward the selection of the I-V launch order. 
11. POINT-OF-DEPARTURE AND UNCERTAINTY 
Note that the selected 1½-launch operational concept 
represents only a point-of-departure architecture to be used 
as a baseline for ongoing lunar architecture studies. It does 
not represent a final selection of launch order, separation, or 
loiter period, and NASA is taking no steps to preclude a 
change in the operational concept in the future. 
In fact, because of the uncertainty that is involved in the 
initial design and costing, the possibility exists that, upon 
further refinement, the parameters that drive this study 
could change to a degree that would cause the operational 
concept to be reconsidered.  
In addition, significant uncertainty exists in the data that 
were used to generate the PnSL results in C-RAST. Because 
the Ares V is still in the early stages of design, large amount 
of uncertainty still exists as to the launch reliability for the 
vehicle. As the design matures and more accurate estimates 
of reliability become available, the operations concept could 
also be reconsidered.  
In fact, it may ultimately be desirable to develop a 1½-
launch system that allows for launch in either order. For the 
purposes of this study, the Ares V reliability and, therefore, 
the PnSL were treated as constant values. Because there is a 
limited test program for the Ares V before the crewed lunar 
mission begins, there is liable to be significant growth in 
reliability for the Ares V over a number of missions. If the 
initial reliability is low, then the desire would be to launch 
the Ares V first so that the crew is not launched 
unnecessarily. Because the values used in this analysis 
represent the mature steady-state estimates, the PnSL for the 
I-V options could be worse than predicted in this analysis 
for some number of early missions. If the initial reliability is 
significantly lower, then it may be desirable to launch initial 
missions in a V-I order and then switch to I-V as reliability 
improves.  
To address this uncertainty, an additional set of analyses 
was completed. In this uncertainty analysis, calculations 
were made to determine how much each major input 
parameter would have to change in order to cause the 
launch option decision to change, if that decision were made 
on expected replacement cost alone. The analysis was 
conducted by comparing the final two options: the I-V 4-
day loiter and the V-I 4-day loiter cases. 
The results of the uncertainty analysis are shown in Table 
14. In this table, the current estimate used for each major 
parameter is listed. Then, the value for each parameter at 
which the launch order decision (based on the expected cost 
of failure) would switch is listed. Generally, the required 
shifts are large, although the required changes in Table 14 
are for single variables only. Simultaneous changes of 
multiple parameters that are lower in magnitude could also 
cause a change in the launch order decision. 
The greatest level of uncertainty in the current analysis 
involves the transportation element replacement costs. 
Because of the uncertainty involving fixed and marginal 
costs for Altair and because of the uncertain nature of cost 
estimates in early design large shifts could potentially occur 
in the cost data for all elements as the designs mature. 
Table 14. Sensitivity of Launch Order Decision to Major 
Parameters 
Parameter Current Estimate 
Value at Which 
Launch Order 
Would Switch (if all 
other values remain 
constant) 
PnSL I-V 
(4-day loiter) 5.4% 13.5% 
PnSL V-I 
(14-day loiter) 4.7% 1.9% 
Cost of Ares I 
Stack 1.00 AI 2.5 AI 
Cost of Ares V 
Stack 2.88 AI 1.15 AI 
 
In order to represent the impact of uncertainty in the cost 
data, a “breakeven” cost ratio was determined. The 
important factor in comparing expected costs for the I-V 
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and V-I launch orders is not the absolute costs of the Ares I 
and Ares V stacks but rather the relative costs between the 
two. Given the predicted PnSL values for the I-V and V-I 
cases, any set of cost data in which the cost of the Ares V is 
greater than 115% of the cost of the Ares I will result in the 
expected replacement cost per mission for the I-V option 
being lower. This relationship is depicted graphically in 
Figure 6. 
Figure 6 can be used to determine the resultant optimal 
launch order for any set of Ares I and Ares V stack 
replacement costs, based on minimizing the expected cost of 
failure. The cost of the Ares V stack is specified on the 
horizontal axis, and the cost of the Ares I stack is specified 
on the vertical axis. The sloping red line in the center of the 
figure represents the break-even cost boundary. If the set of 
costs is below this line in the light-blue region, then the I-V 
launch order is preferable. If the set of costs are above the 
red line in the light-green region, then the V-I launch order 
is preferable. 
The intent of Figure 6 is to provide a visual indication of 
how much change could occur in the cost estimates before 
the launch order decision would be reconsidered. The 
current cost estimates are represented as a vertical bar on 
the chart. The Ares I cost is fixed at 1.00 AI. The Ares V 
cost is represented as a range of 1.65 to 2.88 AI, which 
represents the full range that is produced by the possible 
inclusion of fixed costs.  
Across the range of current cost estimates, a large margin 
still exists before the break-even point is reached. Even with 
no fixed costs included for the Ares V, the Ares V cost 
would have to decrease by 32%, or the Ares I cost would 
have to increase by 47% for the cost of failure to be equal 
for the two cases. These changes seem to be outside the 
current range of cost uncertainty. 
The Constellation Program has initiated an action to 
monitor the key parameters identified in this analysis as the 
transportation element designs continue to mature. If the 
designs reach a state at which the selected point-of-
departure operational concept is called into question, then 
this baseline may be updated.  
12. SUMMARY 
The initial specification of an operational concept for the 
1½-launch solution was largely based on three assumptions. 
First, there was a “gut reaction” that one would not want to 
risk launching a crew until the EDS and lander were safely 
in orbit. Second, the assumption was made that the 
probability of missing the second launch could be 
substantially reduced by providing a long loiter period for 
the EDS. Finally, with long EDS loiter periods, the 
assumption was made that a 24-hour launch separation 
would have no significant impact on mission success. 
Figure 6 – Relative Ares I and Ares V Stack Costs 
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More detailed analysis indicated that all three of these 
assumptions were not entirely accurate. The added risk to 
the crew, dictated by the conditional probability of enduring 
a second launch and encountering a loss-of-crew event, was 
quite small, especially as compared with the total risk for a 
human lunar mission. 
The ability to use added loiter to reduce PnSL was largely 
limited by the Ares V capabilities. Loiter periods of more 
than four days would require a change to the selected Ares 
V option (significantly increasing DDT&E and unit cost) 
and would substantially increase the complexity of the EDS.  
Finally, with shorter loiter periods, the 24-hour launch 
separation significantly increased the probability of no 
second launch. The increase in PnSL outweighed the 
advantages of having a long separation between the 
launches. 
Taking these limitations into account, the assumed launch 
order, launch separation, and loiter duration were called into 
question. A structured methodology to evaluate the 
probability of failure, the cost of failure, and the risk to the 
crew allowed NASA decision makers to methodically 
compare the options and to select a point-of-departure for 
1½-launch operations that would result in the best expected 
mission performance. 
Loiter durations of greater than four days were determined 
to be nonviable. The added cost and complexity of the Ares 
V and the EDS, particularly during the DDT&E period, 
would impose significant affordability issues. Although the 
PnSL could be substantially reduced by increasing the 
loiter, these improvements did not justify the added 
complexity. 
With loiter periods limited to four days or less, the 24-hour 
launch separation was also determined to be nonviable. 
Although switching to a 90-minute separation would 
impose some operational complexity at launch and could 
impose some additional risk to the crew in a V-I launch 
order, these factors were outweighed by the significant 
penalty to PnSL. 
Finally, the launch order itself was evaluated. With a 4-day 
loiter, both launch orders resulted in similar values for 
PnSL. The I-V order would result in some added crew risk 
in the event of a missed launch, but the magnitude of the 
added risk was determined to be quite small, especially 
because the crew would face some indeterminate added 
flight hazard risk in the V-I option as well. The major 
discriminator between launch orders was in the expected 
cost of failure. Because a 1½-launch failure in the V-I order 
would result in the loss of an Ares V, the EDS, and the 
Altair lander, the consequence of failure is quite high. A 
failure in the I-V launch order would result in substantially 
lower costs to replace the Ares I and an Orion service 
module and refurbish an Orion crew module. The result of 
the large difference in relative costs is that the expected cost 
of failure is substantially lower for the I-V launch order. 
The results of the study allowed decision makers to select a 
I-V launch order, with a 90-minute separation and a 4-day 
EDS/Orion LEO loiter period as the point-of-departure 
operational concept. This concept will serve as the baseline 
for ongoing lunar mission development. However, as 
designs mature and the major parameters used in this 
analysis are refined, the operational concept for the 1½-
launch solution will be further evaluated. 
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